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A System of Emission Rights Auction
With Revenue Plowback
Lok Sang Ho1
Abstract
This paper demonstrates that “grandfathering” of pollution rights
may be inefficient when existing polluters enjoy market power or
when there are increasing returns to abatement efforts. On the other
hand an “auction and refund” approach, by effectively charging
producers for the pollution they cause and refunding them in
proportion to the value of their economic output levels, will result in
greater efficiency and equity. Moreover, this will resolve the possible
complaint that a revenue-raising auction constitutes a “taking” of
private property, and will address the worry that emission rights
auctions may lead to higher electricity prices. It is argued that thin
trading of emission rights need not undermine the value of the
emission rights auction.

1. Introduction
The idea of emission trading has had a long history, dating back to the
mid 1970s, when the US Environmental Protection Agency
experimented with the idea of requiring any increase in pollution from
an existing or new source to be offset by emission reductions from
other sources. Notwithstanding obvious theoretical advantages in
1
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such an arrangement, a recent study found such programs in the
United States “have generally failed to generate considerable trades.”
“[R]etrospective reviews have tended to blame their shortcomings on
high transaction costs, uncertainty and risk in obtaining government
approvals, as well as lack of clear legal authority and clearly specified
objectives.” (Environmental Law Institute, 2001, [6]). The relative
low volume of trades, however, does not in itself indicate that the
marketization of pollution rights has “failed” as an instrument of
public policy. As this paper argues, by auctioning pollution rights
and refunding the revenue to polluters (after subtracting
administrative and monitoring costs) in direct proportion to their
output (economic output, not pollution) levels, the system will
enhance efficiency and will generate huge economic benefits even in
the absence of active trading among the polluters, because it allocates
the pollution rights efficiently and encourages polluters to maximize
the value of output per unit of pollution.
As pointed out by the EPA document (US Environmental Protection
Agency, 2003, [11] p.2-6), in situations where greater environmental
certainty is needed, cap and trade programs are preferable to emission
charges or taxes because the cap sets an emission goal that pollution
sources must meet. In principle, an annual emission cap can be set
for a country, for a region, or even for the world as a whole.2 The
cap effectively generates a “quota” that can be distributed to existing
or potential polluters within the region, the country, or the world, as
the case may be. Nordhaus and Boyer [10] used the term “where
efficiency” to refer to the efficient allocation of pollution over
space—within a country, across a region, or over the globe, and the
term “when efficiency” to refer to the efficient inter-temporal
2

Asheim, et.al. (2006[1]) demonstrated that regional agreements often dominate
global agreements for environmental preservation and may serve as a supplement, if not
an alternative, for global ones.
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allocation of pollution. Setting a cap on pollution over a defined
space and adjusting it over time can potentially bring about both kinds
of efficiency.
Traditionally it is believed that the initial allocation of the quota
among polluters only has distributional consequences but not
efficiency consequences.
The distribution may be done
administratively based on some stipulated criteria. Alternatively the
distribution may be done through an auction mechanism. The
political nature of the initial allocation is underscored by the fact that
administrative distribution amounts to creating winners and losers
(EPA, 2003, [11] p.3-14) by decree. On the other hand auctions,
through treating all producers new and old as equals, are clearly fairer
and more neutral, but they are regarded as a tax on the industry and so
could constitute a case of “taking of private property.”
As pointed out by the EPA document, distribution of the quota is
always a difficult issue. Burtraw et. al. (2001, [3]) examined three
alternative approaches to initial allocation. One is a revenue-raising
auction. The second is “grandfathering,” which would allocate
allowances on the basis of historic generation. The third is a
“generation performance standard,” which would update allowance
allocations based on shares of current electricity generation.3 As
expected, they found the auction to be “dramatically more
cost-effective than the other approaches”, but consumers would face
the highest electricity charges.
“The generation performance
standard (GPS) leads to the lowest electricity price and consumers are
best off under the generation performance standard when examining
3

For example, as Beamon et.al. [3] explained: “if the national cap on CO2
emissions were set at 1.914 billion tons (the 1990 CO2 emission level for the electricity
sector) and the total generation from all plants covered under the cap equaled 4 billion
megawatthours in a particular year, the GPS would equal 0.479 tons CO2 (0.119 metric
tons carbon equivalent) per megawatthour generated.”(p. 2)
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just electricity price changes.” This result is clearly related to the fact
that the revenue-raising auction represents a tax on the power
generation industry. In contrast, “The allocation of allowances
[under the generation performance standard] at zero cost represents a
cost saving relative to AU (Auction) that is similar to GF (Grand
Fathering). However, under GPS the allowances are allocated on the
basis of generation, so firms are forced to compete for allowances by
increasing generation at the margin. The subsidy implicit in the
allowance allocation is netted against marginal cost, causing
electricity prices and producer surplus to fall in competitive regions.”
(p.22)
In this paper, I shall demonstrate that the auction approach does not
have to involve revenue generation, as is assumed by Burtraw et. al.
(2001 [3]). For the purpose of this paper and for simplicity I shall
assume that polluters are all power companies. Their economic
output is electricity. It is proposed that any funds raised through the
auction net of administrative expenses be refunded to producers in the
industry in proportion to the power generated. This approach will
be seen as fairer, as favoritism cannot come into play. It will also
end up reducing cost to consumers without compromising the
effectiveness of the emission control.
In Section 2 I shall show that the assignment of pollution rights is not
efficiency-neutral. I shall demonstrate that under the “grandfathering”
of initial rights, even when open market trading of these rights in the
subsequent periods is permitted, power generation is likely to be
inefficient when the recipient enjoys monopoly power or when
pollution abatement is subject to increasing returns the degree of
which varies from producer to producer. Section 3 goes on to
elaborate on a proposal of an auction combined with a refund policy
and will demonstrate how it works. Section 4 will explain the
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rationale of the refund policy.
conclusions.

Finally Section 5 will draw the

2.

Grand Fathering May be Inefficient

2.1

The Static Consideration

Traditionally, analysts think of emission rights trading as involving (1)
allocating rights among existing polluters in the first place, and (2)
setting up a mechanism to allow free trading of these rights thereafter.
As mentioned above, Stage (1) is often presumed to entail only
distributional consequences, so that regardless of how the pollution
rights are distributed in the first instance, trading among polluters will
see to it that the rights will go to whoever can utilize them most
efficiently, thus resulting in efficiency.
This line of thinking is problematic for two reasons. First, the initial
allocation of the pollution rights may prevent the potential polluters
from enjoying and acquiring the economies of scale to compete.
Those with the larger allocation are more likely to survive, even
though they may not be efficient producers, while potential
competitors may not be given any chance to compete at all. This has
to do with dynamic efficiency. This point will be elaborated below.
Second is a static consideration that applies when the existing polluter
wields monopoly power and is assigned pollution rights. Although
in the absence of monopoly power a producer may be in his own self
interest to sell these rights to others if the value is higher to others
than to himself, if it wields monopoly power it may act like a
profit-maximizing monopolist and may prefer to restrict the supply of
pollution rights in an attempt to achieve the maximum revenue.

5

Q Units of Pollution Rights Assigned Gratis

Figure 1: Traditional
System: Polluter M
sells Q* units and
keeps Q-Q*

P
D

MC of Selling
The Rights

Market Demand for Pollution Rights

MR of Selling
the Rights

Pollution Rights

Q* Q

Note: MC is rising because as more is released to the market retained rights
become fewer and more valuable. The opportunity cost of releasing the rights is
the value of these rights to the original recipient.

In Figure 1, polluter M is assumed to be given free allocation of all
the pollution rights. Suppose MC depicts the marginal cost of
selling the pollution rights. The rising MC indicates that the more he
gives up the rights the greater will be the opportunity cost, which is
simply the value of using the rights himself. We have drawn MC as
lying below D, which is the marginal social benefit of using the rights
when all the quota is used up. Thus M is an inefficient polluter.
MR=MC results in his profit maximizing sales Q*, with a profit
maximizing price P, which his competitors have to pay. The polluter
captures, in addition to PQ*, also the value under the MC curve from
Q* to Q as it utilizes the retained quota Q-Q*.
In the example potential competitors are far more efficient but have
no rights while the pre-existing polluter enjoys free rights. If the
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assigned rights are permanent, any improvement in productivity
among new competitors, such as signaled by an upward shift in the
demand curve (Market Demand for Pollution Rights), would further
give the initial polluter a bigger capital gain as the pollution rights
fetch a higher market price. This cannot be justified because it
represents a growing economic rent arbitrarily distributed to the initial
polluter, who does not have to improve its productivity at all, but
captures much of the benefits of the productivity gains achieved by
others.
2.2

The Dynamic Consideration

The dynamic consideration refers to the fact that pollution reducing
technology may be subject to economies of scale or increasing returns,
and that even if new competitors are potentially more efficient they
will be cost-disadvantaged if existing firms enjoy free pollution rights
while they have to purchase. We will assume that the price of
pollution rights is not subject to the influence of any second-hand
supplier. For example, the price of pollution rights may be
determined in the regional or the world market.
Consider that a power plant has the following production function:
Q(KQ, LQ)

(1)

where KQ and LQ represent capital and labor devoted to power
generation.
Environmental damage is assumed to be a function of output and
abatement inputs:
D(Q, KA, LA)

(2)
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where KA and LA represent respectively the capital and labor used in
the abatement of the pollution. D1 > 0, D2< 0, D3 < 0. Increasing
returns to abatement implies D22< 0, D33 < 0
For power companies that enjoy a quota D which is the pollution
entitlement for which no charge is applicable, his total profit function
is:
PQ Q(KQ, LQ, D) - PK(KQ + KA) – PL(LQ + LA) – PD( D – D)

(3)

if D is bigger than D.
In this case the power company j will need to buy additional pollution
rights from the market, and their abatement spending offsets the cost
of the pollution rights at the margin:
PK = − PD

∂D(Q, K A , L A )
∂K A

PL = − PD

∂D(Q, K A , L A )
∂L A

, and

(4)

The profit function is equal to
PQ Q(KQ, LQ, D) - PK(KQ + KA) – PL(LQ + LA) + PD( D – D) (5)
if D is smaller than D
In this case the power company j will have pollution rights to sell to
the market. Abatement allows the companies to spare rights that can
be sold at a price. The first order marginal conditions (4) still apply
and will not change. Total pollution from this power company D* =
D*(Q*, KA*, LA*) where Q*, KA*, LA* are all solved from the first
order maximization conditions.
For power companies that do not enjoy any quota, the profit function
is:
8

PQ Q(KQ, LQ) - PK(KQ + KA) – PL(LQ + LA) – PDD

(6)

Now suppose a potential competitor i has a more efficient production
function, so that pollution is smaller per unit of output, with the
environmental damage function being:

D(aQ, KA, LA) ,

where a < 1 so that

∂D j
∂Di
=a
∂Q j
∂Qi

Moreover, under increasing returns to abatement,

(7)
∂2D
∂K A

2

〈0 .

Although i could well replace j and would produce more output
with the same pollution level, the “grandfathering” awards j with the
free pollution quotas, rendering j profitable but i unprofitable. With
the need to pay for all of its pollution i’s marginal cost is higher and
will fail to generate sufficient electricity for it to benefit from the
economies of scale. The marginal cost of i can be obtained by
differentiating:
PK(KQ+KA) + PL(LQ+LA) + PD.D

(8)

with respect to Q, which is equal to:
PK

∂K Q
∂Q

+ PL

∂LQ
∂L

+ PK

∂K A ∂D
∂L ∂D
∂D
+ PL A
+ PD
∂D ∂Q
∂D ∂Q
∂Q

(9)

Although j’s marginal cost would comprise similar terms, being the
first derivative of the following expression with respect to Q:
PK(KQ+KA) + PL(LQ+LA) + PD.(D-D)

(10a) or

PK(KQ+KA) + PL(LQ+LA) - PD.(D-D)

(10b)

by virtue of the fact of increasing returns that it enjoys, one key
component of the marginal cost,

PD
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∂D
,
∂Q

may be lower for j than for i.

Total cost (10a) or (10b) is also much lower than total cost for i,
which is equation (8) for the same output, implying that average cost
for j will be much lower than that for i.

3. The Proposal
Now consider the following proposal. Every year the government
auctions an amount D and all polluters have to compete for these
rights equally. All polluters, potential as well as existing, can
compete for these rights in the open bidding process.
The
equilibrium price will make sure that ∑ D = D . Now it may be
complained that some of the polluters, who had never been asked to
pay any pollution tax or to buy any pollution right, are now asked to
pay. The suddenly imposed cost may pose difficulties for them and
they may not have the resources to address the problem. Ideally, the
charges are recycled to support the investment to abate or to reward
abatement already implemented. To address this complaint, I
propose that the polluters be refunded the net revenues from running
this system: i.e., after deducting any necessary administration or
monitoring charges (=C), the amounts collected be all refunded, on a
pro rata basis in proportion to the values of outputs (Table 1).
Under this arrangement, those firms who have invested in reducing
pollution and who enjoy a high “output value: pollution ratio”, will
collect an amount that may even exceed the amount paid to buy the
pollution rights. On the other hand, firms that are inefficient, those
who produce small output but large pollution, those who have never
invested to reduce pollution, will be penalized the most. All firms
will have the incentive to increase efficiency, and all investments,
regardless of timing, that reduce pollution are rewarded as long as
they are effective.

10

In principle the refunds should be based on the values of approved
outputs. That would take care of situations in which different kinds
of outputs are involved. It is possible that different kinds of outputs
may be causing the same pollution that requires the specified rights.
It will then not be possible to calculate the entitlements to refunds, if
physical output units are used. Moreover, efficiency is in principle
higher if polluters produce higher value outputs than if they produce
lower value outputs, given the same pollution levels generated.
However, there may be a potential problem if the prices of outputs are
regulated prices rather than market prices, in which case imputed
output prices may be more appropriate. The reason why the word
“approved” is added is that we should not rule out the possibility that
an original polluter is so successful that all pollution is eliminated.
Approved outputs refer to outputs that are known to require a
pollution-generating production process unless special investment is
made to eliminate or to reduce the pollution. In the event that
pollution becomes zero the original polluter may not need to buy any
pollution rights at all. Yet he as a potential polluter should still be
entitled to the refund as a reward for the pollution- eliminating
investment that was made.
Table 1: Pollution Rights Bidding and Refund System

Pollution Level

Output Level
(in $ of approved
output)

Net Cost of
Pollution Rights
After Refund

Polluter 1

D1

Q1

PDD1 – RQ1

Polluter 2

D2

Q2

PDD2 – RQ2

Polluter 3

D3

Q3

PDD3 – RQ3

Revenue
collected/refunded

PD ∑ D Collected

R ∑ Q Refunded

PD ∑ D - R ∑ Q

Notes: PD is determined in the market through competitive bidding or auction of
D = ∑ D rights. R is the refund per unit of output determined by

( PD ∑ D − C ) / ∑ Q where C is the administrative and monitoring cost.

11

Within the year, any pollution rights that are found to have been
purchased in excess can be resold in the open market. However,
unused pollution rights at the end of the year will expire.4 Thus no
one will be able to capture the economic rent associated with the
increasing scarcity value of the rights over time.

4. The Need to Plough Back Collected Revenue
The proposal to return all the revenue raised through the auction to
the producers in proportion to the values of their outputs may be
discomforting to those who look at the prices paid for the pollution
rights as simply reflecting a cost that is inflicted on society.
Ultimately, it is argued, the consumers of the products whose
production involves some damage to the environment may need to
pay for the cost of that damage. But prices are useful only as long as
they guide resource allocation. If resource allocation is already
optimal—and we are assuming that science has already established
the optimal amount of pollution reduction and we are already
implementing effectively the annual pollution quota—there will be no
additional gains for raising prices higher than what is necessary for
these purposes. In a world with two goods A and B and a single
input, suppose optimal resource allocation is 1/3 of the resource for
the production of A and 2/3 for the production of B. If production is
efficient, and the resource allocation is optimal, then the equilibrium
market prices consistent with this equilibrium must be optimal prices.
The fact that the production of A causes pollution will not change the
4

McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002[8], 2003[9]) propose two kinds of pollution
permits, one with an expiry date and one without in their “Blueprint”. The
“Blueprint” is attractive in being flexible: the perpetual permits could be traded among
firms, or bought and retired by environmental groups. Governments, too, could buy
back permits in future years if new evidence on climate change indicates that emissions
should be cut more sharply. But rents would accrue to parties that may not be seen as
deserving.
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fact that these are optimal prices—so long as the optimal resource
allocation between A and B are in the ratio 1:2. A revenue-raising
auction gives the government or the auction administration resources
to be spent at their will. To the extent that this spending does not
reflect the choices of individuals in the market place, this will lead to
a deadweight loss.
The need to return any collected revenue to the industry is not only
based on efficiency grounds but also on legal grounds. As Ellerman
(1998 [5]) pointed out, auctioning the permits implicitly assumes that
“the government owns the rights that are to be auctioned.” Since
“these incipient rights are possessed de facto by existing emitters and
exercised by them” “the auction is not just a tax in disguise, but
anticipatory confiscation of rights being established by time-hallowed
use.” (pp.2-4) Returning the revenue collected to the industry deals
with this issue of the legitimacy of the implicit tax.
As was pointed out by Burtraw et. al. (2001[3], 2005[4]), under a
revenue-raising auction the price of electricity generated will be
higher than under revenue-neutral options, such as grandfathering or
the generation performance standard. By itself, the fact that prices
rise above what is necessary to bring pollution in line with what is
considered optimal implies that efficiency is affected. In general, it
will reduce profitability and reduce investment in power generation.
But the pollution level is the same as under auction-with-plowback,
less electricity will be generated at a higher price. Pollution per unit
of power generated will actually be higher.
For simplicity let us assume that there are two industries X and Y. If
there are no externality effects, optimal allocation of investment
between the two industries is achieved when:

13

∂PV X ∂PVY
=
∂K Y
∂K X

(11)

where PV represents the present value of the net income stream from
each industry. If industry X produces an environmental damage, the
present value of the cost of this damage should be netted out PVX , so
that
∂ ( PV X − PVC X ) ∂PVY
=
∂K Y
∂K X

(12)

This condition would be achieved if external costs are fully priced.
In that case any profit arising in a period would reflect the value of
output minus all factor costs minus all pollution costs. As long as
pollution is fully priced both output level and the choice of
technology will be optimal.
An important question is exactly what fully pricing pollution mean?
Since real prices are relative prices, the idea of fully pricing pollution
is so that the technology of production is optimal and that the level of
production of the outputs is optimal. As long as the socially optimal
amount of emission rights are auctioned off and put into the most
socially profitable use there is no need to further tax investment in
power generation, which is what a revenue-raising auction amounts to.
By plowing back the revenue to power companies in proportion to the
power generated, we reward firms for choosing an efficient
technology and avoid taxing them on top of requiring the emissions to
fall back to the optimal level.
Effectively, under this system, the firm j’s profit function becomes:
( PQ +

PD ∑ D − C

∑Q

)Q j ( K Qj , LQj ) − PK ( K Qj + K Aj ) − PL ( LQj + L Aj ) − PD D j

(13)
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The first order conditions for profit maximization are obtained by
maximizing with respect to KQ, LQ, KA, LA. The existence of the
refund motivates the firm to enhance its production efficiency.
∂Π j
∂KQj

= (PQ +

PD ∑D −C ∂Qj
∂Dj ∂Qj
− Pk − PD
)
=0
∂Qj ∂KQj
∑Q ∂KQj

⇒ PK = ( PQ +
∂Π j
∂K Aj

∂D j ∂Q j
PD ∑ D − C ∂Q j
)
− PD
∂Q j ∂K Qj
∑ Q ∂K Qj

= − PK − PD

⇒ PK = − PD

∂D j
∂K Aj

(14)

=0

∂D j

(15)

∂K Aj

In deriving these first order conditions, it is noted that since the total
quota is fixed, one firm’s increase in pollution will not increase the
funds available for redistribution and will only affect how the total
amount is shared. As a result all derivatives of

PD ∑ D − C

∑Q

with

respect to KQj, LQj, KAj, and LAj vanish to zero. Moreover, since the
first order conditions from differentiating with respect to LQj and LAj
are direct mirrors of equations (14) and (15) they need not be repeated.
From equation (14), we can see that the refund per unit of output
increases the attractiveness of boosting production. Moreover, (14)
tells us that capital should be utilized until the marginal social benefit
of the capital is equal to the price of capital, and

PD ∑ D − C

much part of the benefit of the marginal output as

∑Q

is as

PD

is an

∂D j
∂Q j

external cost when output-augmenting capital is put into production.
In equation (15), capital for pollution abatement is utilized until the
price of capital is equal to the savings from the reduction in the need
for pollution rights.
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There is a further point regarding the subtraction from auction
proceeds before refund. While it was stated that auction proceeds
minus administration and monitoring costs are refunded to power
generation firms in proportion to the values of their outputs,
“administrative and monitoring cost” is actually a variable that may
affect outcomes. An emission rights market requires enforcement,
and enforcement effort can be made bigger or smaller.
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006[7]) showed that the
emission levels of firms will vary with the monitoring or auditing
effort. Accordingly, as long as the marginal benefit in terms of this
effectiveness is bigger than the marginal opportunity cost of the
revenue, money should be deducted from the revenue raised to
enhance the enforcement effort before the leftover is distributed.

5. Conclusions
The proposed system of openly auctioning yearly pollution rights
assumes that we know how much pollution in total should be allowed.
We may not have very accurate information on this, but any system of
environmental management will have to either assume that we have
the right target quantity of pollution (in which case the price of
pollution rights is endogenous) or that we have the right price of
pollution rights (in which case the amount of pollution resulting
becomes endogenous). Once we have made this assumption, the
proposed system will allow us to hit the target in the aggregate among
the relevant jurisdictions and allocate the emission rights fairly and
efficiently among existing and potential polluters. Pollution rights are
not assigned according to historical pollution levels and have to be
acquired on the same terms by all existing and potential polluters
through an open auction. The collected revenues, after deducting
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administrative and monitoring costs 5 , are recycled to provide
incentives and financing for polluters to clean up and to improve
efficiency. Because the “refund” is in proportion to the value of
pollution-generating output firms that produce the greatest value for
any given pollution are rewarded, while those that produce high
pollution but little value are punished. Existing polluters will not be
rewarded by large assignment of free pollution rights. Because
pollution rights are defined over a specific time period most of the
rights purchased through this competitive bidding process are
expected to be utilized. Only the excess rights are resold and
purchased by those firms that experience a shortfall. As a result only
minimal emission trading is expected. Yet the system is efficient
both because efficient firms are rewarded and because pollution rights
are obtained by competition and not assigned by decree.

5

These expenses can be paid in the first place from the general revenue and then
paid back later on after the revenue from emission rights auction has been collected.
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